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Introduction 
 
For obvious reasons, researchers and policy-makers alike have an interest in assessing 
the performance of small firms as well as in understanding the factors that contribute 
to it. Attaining such knowledge is not a trivial undertaking. Researchers have pointed 
out that the performance of small firms can be difficult to assess (Brush & 
Vanderwerf, 1992)—e.g., because reliable data cannot be obtained—and also difficult 
to predict (Cooper, 1995). In this paper I will discuss the equally important and 
difficult issue of how research results regarding small business performance and its 
predictors can or should be interpreted. In particular, I will discuss whether 
commonly used performance indicators like survival vs. non-survival and growth vs. 
non-growth really reflect ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ performance, as is commonly assumed. 
Although theory and other researchers’ findings will also be used to some extent, my 
exposition will rely primarily on experiences and illustrations from a number of 
research projects I have been directly involved in during the last 20 years.    
 The paper proceeds as follows. I will first question the assumption that 
business discontinuance—often called ‘failure’—is a ‘bad’ outcome that best should 
be avoided from the aggregate perspective of the economic system. I will then 
continue to discuss ‘failure’ from more of a micro-perspective, arguing that most 
instances of discontinuation of new or emerging firms are not associated with 
substantial financial losses and do not necessarily represent efforts that should have 
been avoided. Staying at the micro level I will then turn to the issue of firm growth 
and the conditions under which growth represents a ‘good’ outcome from the 
perspective of the firm’s principal stakeholders. I will then return to the aggregate 
level and discuss the extent to which firm level employment growth translates to net 
increases of employment in the economy. Finally, the implications of the issues raised 
in the paper will be restated and discussed in the concluding section of the paper. 
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Is ‘failure’ such a bad thing? A macro view 
 
Schumpeter (1934) introduced the notion of ‘creative destruction’ and suggested that 
innovations are often introduced by outsiders to an industry. Ever since, the notion 
that incumbents have problems introducing (radical) novelty has been a recurring 
theme. on the firm level, this has been discussed under various labels such as 
‘incumbent inertia’ (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), ‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-
Barton, 1992), ‘liabilities of adolescence and obsolescence’ (Henderson, 1999) and a 
range of other terms (Mosakowski, 2002). If there is any truth to incumbents’ relative 
inability to innovate, entry of new firms become essential to the dynamism of the 
economy. Accordingly, researchers and policy-makers have shown a great deal of 
interest in firm entry.  
But “Whatever happened to ‘destruction’ in ‘creative destruction’?” asks 
McGrath (2003) rhetorically. While embracing the ‘creative’ side of Schumpeterian 
dynamism it seems that researchers and policy-makers have either neglected or failed 
to adjust their perhaps natural initial negative backbone reaction against the 
‘destructive’ part of it. However, if it is accepted that new entry is important for the 
dynamism of the economy it must also be accepted that the new entrants need to get 
their resources and customers from somewhere. This is inevitably going to lead to 
some decline and sometimes discontinuation of existing organizations. Rather than 
their demise primarily reflecting destruction of resources it reflects, according to the 
Schumpeterian argument, redeployment in better use. As a result, individuals may get 
better, higher-paid jobs; investor may get higher returns, and customers may get better 
products at lower prices as new, superior business models force inferior ones out of 
the market.  
 In the project Business Dynamics in Sweden (Davidsson, Lindmark, & 
Olofsson, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) we found some empirical support 
for this view. In this project we used a carefully customized data set based on a 
combination of Statistics Sweden’s data bases in order to make it possible to track 
entry, exit, expansion and contraction among all commercially active business 
establishments in Sweden from 1985 to 1994. The level of analysis was the region. 
Following the example of Paul Reynolds and co-workers (Reynolds & Maki, 1990; 
Reynolds, Miller, & Maki, 1995) the country was subdivided into 80 Labor Market 
Areas (LMAs). In one of the analyses, which is reproduced in Table 1, we related 
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measures of business dynamism during the first half of the period to the subsequent 
development of regional economic well-being. Two separate indices were used to 
assess the latter. The first consisted of four items reflecting net migration and 
increasing net income whereas the latter consisted of two items reflecting relative 
decrease in welfare recipients and payments.  
   
Table 1. Gross and Net Regional Business Dynamism as Predictors of Subsequent 
Development of Regional Economic Well-being (Based on Davidsson et al., 
1994)    
Net Dynamism Model 
Well-being Index I Well-being Index II Dependent variable
Independent  variables Corr. Beta I Beta II Corr. Beta I Beta II
Net independent entry .31 .31 .33 .42 .41 .43
Independent expansion surplus .18 .14 .14 .26 .30 .29
Net branches entry .15 .11 - .11 -.05 -
Branches expansion surplus .27 .04 - .08 .11 -
Net large branches entry .14 -.05 - .18 .08 -
Large branches expansion surplus .30 .28 .28 -.07 -.21 -
Adj. R2 .16 .18 .22 .24
Gross Dynamism Model 
Well-being Index I Well-being Index II Dependent variable
Independent  variables Corr. Beta I Beta II Corr. Beta I Beta II
Gross new independent entry .40 .46 .09 .09 -.03 -
Independents turnover (entry+exit) .07 -.19 - .44 .20 .18
Gross independent expansion -.12 -.04 - .08 .13 -
Gross branches entry .18 -.07 - .44 -.09 -
Branches turnover (entry+exit) .20 .21 - .64 .60 .55
Gross branches expansion .38 .37 .39 .18 -.08 -
Adj. R2 .29 .30 .41 .41
Note: ‘Independent’ refers to single-site firms. ‘Branches’ are entities within firms with multiple establishments. ‘Large’ 
branches have >20 employees. ‘Beta I’ is the standardized regression coefficient when all explanatory variables are entered. 
‘Beta II’ is the standardized regression coefficient in a model only retaining variables that contribute to an increase in Adj. R2
 
For our current purposes there are three things about these results that are noteworthy. 
First, the predominance of positive coefficients suggests that regions with more 
dynamism experience better development of economic well-being. Second, the R-
squares show that measures of gross dynamism can explain more of the variance than 
can net measures alone. This suggests that not only the ‘creative’ but also the 
‘destructive’ side is important for economic development. Third, especially with 
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respect to the second well-being index, it is the variables directly reflecting 
churning—high levels of entry and exits—that are ascribed the positive effects. The 
implication of these results is that if two regions had zero net change in numbers of 
firms and jobs between two points in time and one region achieved that result through 
survival of all existing firms and jobs whereas the second region achieved the same 
net result through a large number of entries, exits, expansions and contractions 
numerically canceling out each other, the second region would experience better 
development of economic well-being.   
 While the results in Table 1 are admittedly not entirely conclusive they 
represent but one indication out of many in that project that not only entry and 
expansion but also exit and contraction are essential aspects of a well-performing 
economy. Teasing out the true effects of economic turbulence is not an easy task, and 
these effects are also likely to be contingent on business cycle conditions as well as 
country-specific factors. It is therefore not surprising that the collective, international 
evidence is not entirely conclusive, either. However, the balance of the evidence 
seems to support the Schumpeterian argument (Carree & Thurik, 2003: 457-458). 
Importantly, there is enough evidence to suggest that efforts to secure the survival of 
particular firms and particular jobs—i.e., reduce ‘failures’—may well be counter-
productive because resources that would otherwise be redeployed in more productive 
use get locked into obsolete business practices. High numbers of exists are not a bad 
thing as long as the freed up resources are actually redeployed rather than destroyed. 
If this argument be accepted, the policy implication is that policies should facilitate 
rather than hinder this process of resource transfer.  
 
Is ‘failure’ such a bad thing? A micro view 
 
Figures showing that only x percent of start-ups survive the first n years are 
commonplace. Often the figures cited seem quite alarmingly low. Headd (2003) 
mentions, as an example, the US myth that nine out of ten businesses close during 
their first year of operation. Usually these estimates are also presented in such a way 
that one might think that they would not exactly serve as inspiration for intelligent 
individuals to try their luck in independent business start-ups. However, the very high 
estimates typically build on bad data. Firms change identification codes in statistical 
records because of geographical relocation, ownership changes, and changes of legal 
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form or principal industry. Hence, business closures are over reported. For example, 
in the High Growth Firms study (Davidsson & Delmar, 2003, 2006; Delmar, 
Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003) the observed survival of 25 percent of the firms in the 
study was affected by a correction for this issue, and this is in data that are of 
comparatively high quality already. In the SME Growth and Profitability project 
(Davidsson, Steffens, & Fitzsimmons, 2005; see also tables 3 and 4 below) this 
problem shows through the non-trivial proportion of firms that exit although they 
were high performing firms in the previous period. A majority of these exits are 
unlikely to be business failures and more likely to represent, e.g., profitable 
sale/merger to/with another firm. As regards start-ups, higher quality typically data 
typically suggest that some 50 percent survive for at least five years.  
 Moreover, business founders close down for a range of reasons including 
retirement or better opportunities in other businesses, either in employment or self-
employment. Thus, far from all business closures represent ‘failure’ in any 
meaningful sense. The comprehensive study undertaken by Headd (2003) is a good 
example of what a closer and more careful look can reveal. First, his data shows that 
even in the highly dynamic US economy, 50 percent survive for at least four years. 
Second, the discontinuance rates for start-ups that have employees and those that had 
more than USD 50 000 in start-up capital (in the early 1990s) were less than half as 
likely to terminate operations as the average start-up. Thus, most closures were not 
associated with losses of jobs or very substantial sums of money. Further, 29 percent 
of the owners reported their firms as successful at closure. Clearly, discontinuance 
does not always indicate ‘failure’.  
 The perils of interpreting non-continuation as ‘failure’ is also something I 
have come across through my involvement in the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial 
Dynamics (PSED) (Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds, 2000) and 
its international counterparts (Davidsson, 2006; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Delmar & 
Davidsson, 2000). This is longitudinal research about on-going business start-ups. Not 
all of these attempts lead to up-and-running firms. Rather, a slight majority tends to be 
terminated before that stage (Wagner, 2004). Does this mean that the majority of 
start-up efforts are ‘failures’ that should have been avoided?     
 As this research concerns not yet up-and-running firms it is tempting to 
evaluate their performance on the basis of whether they are making progress in the 
start-up process or are discontinued. The logic of analysis techniques such as logistic 
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regression (Davidsson & Honig, 2003) and event history analysis (Delmar & Shane, 
2004) further makes it tempting to use a dichotomous dependent variable—continued 
vs. discontinued—and interpret the former as ‘success’ and the latter as ‘failure’. A 
serious shortcoming of this approach is that the continued group will consist of a mix 
of a) undoubtedly successful cases; b) cases that are unwisely continue although 
available information suggest they should be terminated, and c) those efforts that are 
never put to an ‘acid test’ and therefore are classified as ‘still trying’. The importance 
of this problem is illustrated by Carter, Gartner and Reynolds' (1996) finding that the 
‘up and running’ and ‘abandoned’ cases seemed rather similar. Importantly, both 
categories may have been right in their respective decisions, and discontinued cases 
are not necessarily ‘failures’. If business start-ups are regarded as experiments with 
uncertain outcomes, the only failed cases are the experiments that never lead to a 
conclusive answer. This insight begs the question whether continuing cases are in 
most cases examples of a ‘better’ outcome than the discontinued ones. The latter may 
in many instances be regarded as experiments that were worth doing but which 
successfully established without significant financial losses that what initially seemed 
to be a profitable business opportunity probably was not.  
This shows that continuing vs. discontinued—especially if interpreted as 
successful vs. failed—is not suitable as sole dependent variable in research on 
emerging business ventures. It also suggests that normative conclusions like ‘Our 
results demonstrate that entrepreneurs should complete business plans before talking 
to customers or initiate marketing and promotion’ (Shane & Delmar, 2004: 783) 
should not be drawn on the basis of such analyses. In this particular instance it is 
conceivable, for example, that some of the planners who continue do so unwisely as 
victims of well known psychological phenomena such as ‘escalation of commitment’ 
(McCarthy, Schoorman, & Cooper, 1993) or ‘failure to use negative information’ 
(Davidsson & Wahlund, 1992). There is reason to believe that rather than being 
strongly associated with continuation, predictors indicating some aspect of 
‘entrepreneurial expertise’ should be associated with ‘high financial performance’ 
among survivors and with relatively rapid, low cost abandonment among non-
survivors.  
 Canadian (Diochon, Menzies, & Gasse, 2003) as well as unpublished Swedish 
results from this type of research further suggest that those who dicontinue the project 
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often do so because they want to (e.g., because other, more attractive employment or 
self-employment alternatives surfaced) and not because they have to, and also that 
they do not regret having engaged in the discontinued start-up. Further, McGrath 
(1999) reminds us that involvement in a ‘failed’ start-up may lead to learning that is a 
necessary prerequisite for the next success, and Sarasvathy (2004) rightfully 
emphasizes that a failed venture does not mean a failed entrepreneur.  
It is also clear from PSED-type research that high-ambition start-ups are given 
up more readily than their low-ambition counterparts (Davidsson, 2006). This is 
reminiscent to the exemplary study by Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997). Their 
research demonstrated that different founders have different thresholds for what is an 
acceptable level of performance. An important conclusion to be drawn from this is 
that because individuals with higher levels of human capital will have more attractive 
‘other alternatives’ than will individuals with low  levels of human capital, the effect 
of human capital on the likelihood of firm ‘survival’ at a given level of objective 
performance is likely to be negative.  
 In summary, research suggests that small (and young) firms are not terminated 
at as high rates as previously thought; that many cases of termination are voluntary 
and even may be associated with considerable success; that other cases of closure 
represent viable businesses but that other alternatives are even more promising for the 
owners and hence that the termination is a sound decision; that still other cases are 
sound instances of experimentation leading to the insight that the business will not be 
viable, and that even when there is some aspect of real ‘failure’ involved the 
individuals involved can be happy with the experience and may have learnt invaluable 
lessons from it, which may contribute to future success. Business failures involving 
large financial losses and personal tragedy appear to be relatively infrequent. Efforts 
to help marginal business get started and survive may lock people (and other 
resources) into the wrong projects, potentially reducing both individual and societal 
utility compared with what non-intervention would have resulted in.  
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Is growth such a good thing? A micro view 
 
A large number of studies have investigated small firm growth (see, e.g., Ardichvili, 
Cardozo, Harmon, & Vadakath, 1998; Davidsson, Achtenhagen, & Naldi, 
forthcoming; Storey, 1994, and Wiklund, 1998 for reviews). Usually it is taken for 
granted that growth is an indicator of success. However, as we have already indicated 
above, different small business owner-managers have different goals and growth may 
or may not lead to a situation which is, on balance, better in the view of the firm’s 
principal stakeholders. Growth changes the owner-managers’ situation in many ways, 
and many of them may not be willing to trade, e.g., increased financial gain for 
reduced autonomy (Sapienza, Korsgaard, & Forbes, 2003).  
The clash between economic and business theories (where the willingness to 
expand is usually taken for granted) and business reality (where you do not have to 
talk to many small business managers in order to realize that they are often reluctant 
to expand their firms even if they see profitable opportunities) was in fact my personal 
entry point to business research. Hence, I included in my dissertation study 
(Davidsson, 1989a) a set of questions about owner-managers’ expected consequences 
of growth, which I then related to their over all growth willingness (Davidsson, 
1989b). Each question concerned whether the aspect in question would likely be 
better or worse if the firm were twice as big. The same set of questions were included 
in two other Swedish, survey-based dissertation projects in the 1990s, and the joint 
findings were published in Wiklund, Davidsson, & Delmar (2003)  
The results can be summarized as follows. First, in the aggregate, negative and 
positive expectations exist along all investigated dimensions, and across dimensions 
negative and positive sentiments are about equally prevalent. The strongest 
dominance for positive expectations concerned personal income and the strongest 
dominance for negative expectation occur for vulnerability, i.e., a majority believes 
the firm would have less crisis survival ability if its size were doubled. The vast 
majority of respondents expected some positive and some negative outcomes, i.e., 
growth is a dilemma for them. Finally, as is revealed in Table 2, all investigated 
dimensions were of some importance for overall growth willingness, and financial 
expectation did not stand out as the most important. Instead, concerns for employee 
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well-being—probably the atmosphere of the small work place—was the consistently 
the important predictor across the three studies as well as in breakdowns by size, age 
and industry. This expected outcome works as a growth deterrent more often than it 
works as a growth motivator, i.e., managers often fear some important ‘soft qualities’ 
of the firm would be lost if the firm grew and they therefore refrain from seeking 
expansion. 
 
Table 2.  The effects of growth expectation on growth willingness in three 
separate studies (Wiklund et al., 2003) 
Sample 
 
Variable 
1986 
Sample 
n=287 
Rank 
order 
1994 
Sample 
 n=338 
Rank
order
1996 
Sample 
n=533 
Rank
order 
Joint 
proba-
bility 
Workload .11* 2 .04 7 .02 7 .0015 
Work tasks .04 7 .15** 2 .00 8 .0003 
Empl. well-being .27*** 1 .19*** 1 .25*** 1 >.000001 
Personal income .07 4 .08 5 .12** 4 .000007 
Control .10* 3 .00 8 .13** 2 .00003 
Independence .07 4 .11* 3 .13** 2 .000004 
Vulnerability .07 4 .11* 3 .06 5 .0002 
Quality .04 7 .08 5 .03 6 .04 
Adj. R2 .23  .20  .23   
Note: Results build on responses from owner-managers of established small businesses with 5-49 employees. Forced entry of 
independent variables is used. Standardized regression coefficients are displayed in the Table. *= p< .05; **= p< .01; ***= 
p< .001. Single-tailed test of significance is applied. 
 
These results show that concerns other than economic rationality are important 
to small firm owner-managers. However, even if economic rationality were the only 
guiding star it could still be questioned whether growth is in itself sufficient evidence 
that the stakeholders’ true goals are being met. Although both of these performance 
dimensions have been shown to be empirically related to increases in firm value (Cho 
& Pucic, 2005), neither high growth nor high profitability alone proves that the 
inherent potential in the underlying business opportunity is being optimally harvested. 
A firm can hypothetically achieve infinite volume growth by giving away their 
products more or less for free. High percentage profitability, on the other hand, can be 
achieved by serving only the most profitable market segment although other segments 
could also be served at high, albeit not as high, absolute levels of profits. 
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Hence, profitable growth ought to be the real economic goal of the firm, and 
these two performance dimensions ought to be considered simultaneously. This is the 
vantage point for our on-going research on SME Growth and Profitability (Davidsson 
Davidsson, Steffens, & Fitzsimmons, 2005 and forthcoming). In this project we 
examine large, longitudinal secondary data sets capturing the development of SMEs 
in Australia and Sweden over time. More specifically, we focus on the development 
of firms that first show above average profits (at low levels of growth) with those that 
first show above average growth (at low levels of profit) in order to determine what 
category is more likely to score highly on both performance dimensions in subsequent 
periods, i.e., what firms are likely to attain the favourable state of profitable growth. 
Theoretical arguments can be put forward in favour of either route to profitable 
growth. For example, the existence of scale economies, experience effects or first 
mover advantages suggest firms may have to grow in order to become profitable, 
whereas other lines of reasoning suggest growth based on retained earnings is less 
costly and therefore more profitable (see Davidsson et al., 2005; forthcoming).  
In order to perform the analysis we first classified the firms as each year 
belonging to one of the following five performance groups in each time period. 
 Poor – lowest quartile performance on both performance dimensions  
• Middle – second or third quartile on performance dimensions  
• Growth – highest quartile on growth, but below average profitability 
• Profit - highest quartile on profitability, but below average growth 
• Star – highest quartile on both dimensions  
 
For the end year there also exists a sixth possibility:  
 
• Exit – the firm is no longer included in the data set as a separate entity  
 
Tables 3 and 4 report some of the results. The one-year transitions in Table 3 show 
that firms in the ‘Profit’ category are two to three times more likely than firms in the 
Growth category to reach the desirable Star category in the following year. This is a 
first indication that attempting to ‘grow profitable’ may be a dubious practice. 
However, a route from Growth to Profit would also indicate growth leading to 
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profitability. However, this transition is quite unusual; only six percent of the firms in 
each country take that route. Instead firms in the Growth category alarmingly often 
end up in the Poor category instead, i.e., they become low performing firms according 
to both performance criteria. Firms that first secure a high level of profitability appear 
to have much better prospects. They transition to Star much more often and to Poor 
much more rarely than do the firms in the Growth category.  
 
Table 3.  Aggregated one-year performance group transition percentages for 
Australian and Swedish small and medium-sized firms (Based on 
Davidsson et al., forthcoming)  
Australia   Initial (Year X) Performance Group 
  
Poor 
(n=2057) 
Middle 
(n=2964) 
Growth 
(n=1588)
Profit 
(n=1499) 
Star 
(n=2379) 
TOTAL 
(n=10469) 
Exit 9.1 4.2 6.4 7.8 4.6 5.1 
Poor 30.8 17.9 30.3 11.0 12.9 19.7 
Middle 21.4 45.9 22.8 19.7 19.8 29.1 
Growth 21.2 9.5 22.6 5.6 6.2 12.9 
Profit 6.0 8.8 6.2 26.3 25.4 14.5 
Final 
(Year X+1) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 11.5 13.6 11.6 29.6 31.1 18.7 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sweden   Initial (Year X) Performance Group 
  
Poor 
(n=590) 
Middle 
(n=846) 
Growth 
(n=434)
Profit 
(n=407) 
Star 
(n=675) 
TOTAL 
(n=2952) 
Exit 2.4 0.1 0.5 2.2 0.4 2.0 
Poor 35.4 16.0 28.3 17.7 11.0 21.5 
Middle 23.2 45.5 18.7 19.7 22.4 28.1 
Growth 21.9 9.8 30.9 3.7 6.4 13.2 
Profit 6.3 11.2 6.2 27.0 18.5 12.3 
Final 
(Year X+1) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 10.8 17.4 15.4 29.7 41.3 22.9 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The table reports percentage of firms in specified (initial state) performance group that transitions 
to specified (final state) performance groups. Two (Sweden) or three (Australia) one-year transitions 
are aggregated. Bold entries highlight results of particular interest. 
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Table 4.  Multi-year performance group transition percentages for Australian  
and Swedish small and medium-sized firms (Based on Davidsson et 
forthcoming) 
Australia   Initial (1995) Performance Group  
  
Poor 
(n=619) 
Middle 
(n=930) 
Growth 
(n=605)
Profit 
(n=486) 
Star 
(n=848) 
TOTAL 
(n=3488) 
Exit 31.5 17.2 26.3 28.4 20.5 23.7 
Poor 21.6 14.8 23.1 12.1 12.7 16.6 
Middle 20.4 37.4 18.8 15.6 19.0 23.7 
Growth 11.5 8.9 15.0 3.9 9.0 9.7 
Profit 5.8 10.6 6.4 23.5 15.7 12.1 
Final 
(1998) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 9.2 11.0 10.2 16.5 23.1 14.2 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sweden   Initial (1998) Performance Group  
  
Poor 
(n=295) 
Middle 
(n=429) 
Growth 
(n=226)
Profit 
(n=195) 
Star 
(n=337) 
TOTAL 
(n=1482) 
Exit 3.7 0.7 1.8 3.6 1.2 2.0 
Poor 33.6 20.0 26.1 19.0 11.0 21.5 
Middle 22.7 42.2 24.3 19.5 22.6 28.1 
Growth 21.0 7.5 24.8 7.2 9.5 13.2 
Profit 8.1 10.5 11.5 17.9 15.4 12.3 
Final 
(2000) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 10.8 19.1 11.5 32.8 40.4 22.9 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The table reports percentage of firms in specified start year (initial state) performance group that 
transitions to specified end year (final state) performance group. The Australian data have 1995 and 
1998 as start and end years, while the corresponding years for the Swedish data are 1998 and 2000. 
Bold entries highlight results of particular interest. 
 
In fact, firms in the Middle group, i.e., these firms showing balanced growth-profit 
development in the first period—also outperform the Growth firms in the following 
period. The Middle firms transition to Star more often and to Poor more seldom. It 
should be noted that the interpretation of transitions to Exit is unclear. This category 
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is a mix of failures and termination for other—sometimes very positive—reasons (cf. 
above).   
It may be suspected that the positive effects of embarking on a growth 
trajectory are longer term. Regrettably, the data sets we use cover only three and four 
years for Swedish and Australian firms, respectively. In Table 4 we repeat the 
analysis using the maximum available time span. While the results are less dramatic 
they still point very clearly in the same direction. Firms that first grow starting from 
low profitability (‘Growth’) end up in the Star category more seldom, and in the Poor 
category more often, than do firms that first attain higher than average levels of 
profitability (‘Profit’). Analyses for not displayed here suggest this pattern is fairly 
robust across sub-categories of firm by industry, size and age. And again, over this 
somewhat longer analysis period the Growth firms are outperformed not only by the 
Profit firms but also by the Middle category. Overall, the displayed results give reason 
to question whether growth per se is a sound business goal. They also suggest that 
those small business managers who suspect growth does not pay (Davidsson, 1989b) 
are not always wrong and the findings also cast more favourable light over SME 
owner-managers’ widespread reluctance to finance growth through infusions of 
external equity (Sapienza et al., 2003). 
There may, of course, be exceptions where externally financed growth before 
proof of profitability is needed in order to achieve long term maximization of firm 
value or optimal utilization of the inherent potential of the firm’s business idea. One 
might suspect, for example, that the displayed results, while true for ‘standard’ SMEs 
are not generalizable to high-tech ventures. However, the view that profitability 
should be given pre-eminence over growth has emerged also from research on much 
more special groups of firms. For example, Christensen & Raynor (2003) profess 
“impatience for profits, but patience for growth” in the context of disruptive 
innovation, which is not exactly what the average SME engages in. Thus, the notion 
that firms should go for growth only after first securing a sound level of profitability 
may have rather broad applicability. 
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Is growth such a good thing? A macro view  
 
Following David Birch’s research and coining of the gazelles concept (e.g., Birch & 
Medoff, 1994) as well as research in other countries making similar claims, it has 
become popular beliefs that a small number of rapidly growing firms create most of 
the new jobs in the economy. The empirical truth of such a statement will inevitably 
vary by country and time period. For Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s our 
research shows it was not the case that a small number of gazelles were the heroes of 
the economy (Davidsson & Delmar, 2003, 2006;  Davidsson et al., 1996, 1998b). 
Rather, it was predominantly the entry of many new, independent businesses and their 
in most cases very limited early growth that added up to very significant aggregate 
employment effects. The ‘gazelles’, while sometimes impressive on a case-by-case 
basis, were not numerous enough to add up to comparable total numbers of new jobs. 
This does not show that the ‘gazelles’ story is generally wrong. However, 
those who are interested in who creates most new jobs in a particular country during a 
particular period of time are unlikely to be able to derive a true answer from theory or 
from studies of other empirical contexts. They would likely have to perform or 
consult studies of the particular empirical context they are interested in. In doing so it 
is advisable to watch out for a particular method artefact that automatically produces 
the result that a small proportion of firms are responsible for the lion’s share of all 
new jobs (or other economic contributions).  
The simple simulation in Table 5 illustrates why (cf. Davidsson, 2004: 161-
163). This simulation postulates the existence of 20 firms, which were all started ten 
years ago and which had four employees each at founding.  For each firm each year, 
their growth was determined by first throwing one die. If it showed three or less, the 
firm would shrink; if it showed four or more it would grow. A second throw of a pair 
of dice determined their amount of growth; the average value of the dice was added to 
or subtracted from the firm’s current size. If through this process a firm reached size 
zero or less that firm was considered ‘dead’ (discontinued) from that point on. 
The results show that as few as three firms, i.e., 15 percent of the original 
cohort, jointly employed 75.5 people in the final year. This means than 15 percent of 
the firms accounted for more than 85 percent (63.5/(153.5-80)) of all job creation 
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subsequent to their start-up year. From this we can learn that if there is any outcome 
variation at all, chance alone will always make some cases stand out from the others. 
The best performers need not necessarily impress us and we need not necessarily seek 
substantive explanations for their superior performance. Stochastic processes make 
sure that a small percentage of the firms in any cohort create a large percentage of that 
cohort’s total number of jobs. 
 
Table 5. Simulated size development for a cohort of new firms  
(Davidsson, 2004) 
 
Firm 
Year 1 
size 
Year 2 
size 
Year 3 
size 
Year 4
size 
Year 5
size 
Year 6
Size 
Year 7
size 
Year 8
size 
Year 9 
size 
Year 10 
Size 
1 4 1 X X X X X X X X 
2 4 8 4.5 9.5 15.5 20.5 23.5 28 24.5 29.5 
3 4 1 5 10.5 13.5 10 11 12.5 9 6 
4 4 9 11 15 10.5 13.5 10 13 8 11.5 
5 4 10 13 17.5 13.5 18.5 16.5 14.5 11.5 15 
6 4 1 X X X X X X X X 
7 4 0.5 4.5 2.5 8 14 10 14 10 14 
8 4 8.5 4.5 7.5 4 1 X X X X 
9 4 X X X X X X X X X 
10 4 7 9 5 8.5 11 7.5 6 11.5 16.5 
11 4 6 3.5 4.5 2.5 X X X X X 
12 4 1.5 X X X X X X X X 
13 4 0.5 X X X X X X X X 
14 4 8.5 12 15.5 18.5 22.5 18.5 23 18 23 
15 4 7 4.5 10 7 4.5 1 X X X 
16 4 8 12 15.5 11 7.5 13.5 15.5 12 15 
17 4 10 7 3 0.5 X X X X X 
18 4 2 X X X X X X X X 
19 4 9 12.5 15 17.5 14 18 22 18.5 23 
20 4 5.5 9.5 6 3.5 X X X X X 
Total 
jobs 
80 104 112.5 128 134 137 129.5 148.5 123 153.5 
 
Cohort studies of this kind can be valuable for many purposes, but they are 
deceptive when they are used for making the claim that x percent of the firms 
accounted for y percent of the jobs. This is because what they do not tell is that many 
more jobs are created outside of that cohort—by firms that were already in existence 
and by firms started in years t+1, t+2…t+n. In short, in order to tell what proportion 
of jobs (or other contributions) a particular category of firm makes, the contribution 
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has to be compared with total job creation in the economy and not only to the lesser 
firms in their own cohort. Alternatively, the absolute contributions of the elite of 
‘gazelles’ can be compared to the total levels of employment and/or unemployment in 
the economy as a whole. 
Another important issue to consider for policy-makers who are interested in 
high-growth firms for their job creating potential is the extent to which firm level 
growth really reflects employment growth in the aggregate. Firms can grow either 
organically or though acquisition. Population studies relying on secondary data from 
national statistical agencies or the like can normally not distinguish between these two 
forms of growth. When preparing the data set for the High Growth Firms study 
(Davidsson & Delmar, 2003, 2006; Delmar et al., 2003) we found a way to solve that 
problem. Hence, we are here dealing with a data set covering all firms in Sweden, 
which were commercially active and had at least 20 employees as per November 1996. 
The data set back tracks the development of these firms for ten years or to the first 
year they appear in the underlying records. Their employment changes, if any, can be 
decomposed into organic versus acquisition-based. Tables 6 and 7 display the results 
broken down by firm age and firm size. ‘High-growth firms’ were defined as the ten 
percent of the firms in the data base showing the highest average annual growth in 
(absolute) employment. 
 
Table 6 Total and organic growth for high growth firms of different age 
(Davidsson & Delmar, 2006)  
Firm age (years) No. of cases (n) Cumulative total 
employment growth
Cumulative organic 
employment growth 
Percent organic 
growth
2 148 3319 3191 96.1
3 205 8865 7052 79.5
4 137 6984 6118 87.6
5 77 7043 6619 94.0
6 40 3912 3429 87.7
7 42 6364 4401 69.2
8 38 3920 2992 76.3
9 29 6919 4038 58.4
10 437 137938 22200 16.1
Total  1153  185264  60040 32.4
 
The results are quite illuminating. First, they show that slightly less than 1/3 of 
the employment growth in ‘high growth firms’ actually represents creation of new 
jobs. Thus, on the aggregate level most of what is going on is redistribution of 
existing jobs among organizations. Second, the analysis reveals very strong 
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relationships between firm age and size on the one hand, and mode of growth on the 
other. In a nutshell, young and small firms tend to grow organically whereas older and 
larger firms tend to grow through acquisition. In fact, ‘high growth firms’ in the 
largest size class shrink quite substantially in organic terms. It is only because they 
acquire more jobs than they dissolve that they appear as high-growth firms at all.  
 
Table 8 Total and organic growth for high growth firms of different size 
(Davidsson & Delmar, 2006)  
1987 size class No. of cases (n) Cumulative total 
employment growth
Cumulative organic 
employment growth 
Percent organic 
growth
0 30 6088 4897 80.4
1-9 35 4461 4182 93.7
10-49 91 11617 7797 67.1
50-249 188 32705 17422 53.2
250-499 37 11913 2339 19.6
500-2499 73 50492 3542 7.0
2500+ 13 26750 -13082 (-48.9)
Total 467 144026 27097 18.8
   
1996 size class No. of cases (n) Cumulative total 
employment growth
Cumulative organic 
employment growth 
Percent organic 
growth
20-49 342 8124 7963 98.0
50-249 532 44320 34208 77.2
250-499 127 22340 12497 55.9
500-2499 127 57752 15682 27.2
2500+ 25 52728 -10310 (-19.6)
Total 1153 185264 60040 32.4
Note: The number of cases is smaller when 1987 size class is used because 686 (1153-467) of the firms 
identified as ‘high growth’ were started during the analysed period and hence cannot be assigned to a 
1987 size class. The lower ‘total’ proportion of organic job growth (18.8%) occurs because older firms 
rely more on acquisition-based growth (cf. Table 6). Firms that had fewer than 20 employees in 1996 
were excluded by design; hence the smaller number of size classes in that analysis.  
 
The results show that for smaller and younger firms it is a reasonable 
assumption that job creation on the firm level is predominantly organic and therefore 
reflects true additions of new jobs in the economy at large. However, as further 
explicated in Davidsson (2004, Ch. 8) this type of head counting exercise on the 
micro level has limited value for understanding aggregate level outcomes, because 
even when acquisition and direct job transfer are not involved the organic growth of 
one firm may indirectly crowd out jobs previously existing in competitor firms (and, 
as emphasized above, this ‘creative destruction’ is often a good thing).  
Firms of different size or age do not compete with one another for the title as 
job-creation champions. Firms have different types of inter-relationships ranging from 
being almost entirely unrelated to unidirectional dependence to symbiosis or heads on 
competition (cf. Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993). Firms do not aim at maximizing or 
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minimizing the number of people employed, neither in their own firms nor in the 
economy at large. However, by pursuing their real goals they may create (potential 
for) jobs somewhere in the economy. From this perspective, chasing the truth about 
what category creates most jobs internally is myopic. If the true interest is in 
development on the aggregate level it may be advisable to analyse patterns on that 
level directly rather than making potentially erroneous inferences from firm level 
analysis. 
 
Concluding discussion 
 
This review has demonstrated that ‘it ain’t that easy.’ Termination of start-up efforts 
and closure of established firms are not necessarily worse outcomes than continuation 
and hence they should not be interpreted as ‘failure’ without closer examination. Firm 
growth, in turn, does not always have the straightforward, positive relationship to the 
true goals of micro- and macro-level stakeholders that it is often assumed to have. 
Hence, it is not always a better outcome than non-growth. If these insights be 
accepted, the next questions are ‘What are the implications?’ and ‘What can we do 
about it?’ 
 For business founders I would hold that the first conclusion to be derived from 
our discussion of ‘failure’ is that the goal of the founder should not be to avoid 
‘failure’ at any cost. Safe bets are usually low potential bets. That is, a business start-
up that has a very low likelihood of failure is probably based on widely available 
information and therefore it also has a limited maximum upside gain. Rather than 
avoiding venture start-ups with uncertain outcomes, what skilled entrepreneurs tend to 
do seems to be to reduce the stakes by applying various financial bootstrapping 
techniques (Winborg & Landstrom, 2001) and adopting a flexible, incremental 
strategy, which has the double advantage of increasing survival probabilities by 
adapting the venture to early market reactions and to limit the losses in case the effort 
has to be terminated (Sarasvathy, 2001). Further, in order not to let one adverse 
experience terminate what could be a highly successful entrepreneurial career, 
business founders may want to embrace the notion that a failed venture is not equal to 
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a failed entrepreneur (Sarasvathy, 2004)—although they should also be advised to 
actively learn from the discontinuance experience (McGrath, 1999).  
 As regards growth, some fears that business owner-managers often have—for 
example, as we found, that increased size would make the firm more vulnerable in a 
crises—seem unwarranted. The correlation between either size or growth on the one 
hand, and survival on the other, tends to be positive (Kirchhoff, 1994). Other than that 
it would seem wise for business owner-managers to continue not to accept uncritically 
the pro-growth mantra they often get to hear. If growth is at all to be in line with their 
true goals, it is probably profitable and sustainable growth that should be pursued. If 
market conditions at all permit it, it then seems advisable to first establish a sound 
level of profitability and to base growth to a considerable extent on retained earnings. 
 For policy-makers and important insight is that any attempt to micro-manage 
the economy is likely to discriminate in favor of existing firms and against not-yet-
existing ones. When measures are taken in order to save particular firms and 
particular jobs there is a very real risk that resource redeployment that would benefit 
the economy is being slowed down. As regards start-ups, any attempt to minimize the 
number of ‘failures’ among them inevitably brings with it the risk of reducing the 
level of sound experimentation in the economy to a sub-optimally low level. The 
important issue does not seem to be to minimize the number of terminated 
experiments, but to maximize the number of successful ones. Under the plausible 
assumptions that ‘picking winners’ is a largely futile exercise, increasing the number 
of start-up experiments is the way to achieve a larger number of successes. Hence, 
depending on what the current situation is (there could be a risk of unduly 
discriminating against incumbent firms, too) policy-makers may want to reduce the 
cost of undertaking start-up experiments and remove or reduce any cultural or 
institutionalized ways in which those who are involved in terminated start-ups are 
stigmatized. Again, a failed start-up should not be seen as evidence of incompetence 
or wrong-doing on the part of the individuals involved. Based on the available 
information it may very well have been a sound experiment to undertake.        
 As regards growth, policy-makers need to realize that firm level growth does 
not always translate to growth on the aggregate level. Much of firm growth reflects 
redistribution of activity among business organizations. Often such redistribution may 
lead to increased efficiency, but it is less likely to have a direct, positive link to 
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employment growth on the aggregate level. Second, policy-makers should realize that 
firm growth is not necessarily in line with the owner-managers’ own goals. Thus, it is 
not so easy—as it is often portrayed—that small firms in general represent an 
untapped pool of growth potential and growth willingness, and that external infusion 
of knowledge and financial capital is all that is needed to realize that potential. Many 
small firms do not have much growth potential, and among many of those who do the 
principal stakeholders may not want to expand—especially not if that means they 
have to involve external stakeholders (Sapienza et al., 2003). Third, our review has 
shown that growth that is not matched by sound levels of profitability is often not 
sustainable. For these reasons I find it advisable that policy-makers not try to push 
firms towards growth that they may not want and may not be ready for. Instead, 
policies can be directed towards helping firms become more profitable—an outcome 
that is not likely to be in conflict with their own goals. Our research suggests that 
profitable firms often become sound growing firms. Thus, with an emphasis on 
profitability rather than directly on growth there seem to be better prospects of 
alignment of the goals of the policy-makers and the owner-managers. 
 Moreover, the difficulty of establishing straightforward links between firm 
level outcomes and the aggregate, societal level interests of policy-makers also 
suggests that they should primarily base their policies on insights from aggregate- 
rather than firm-level analysis. Is there enough dynamism in the economy? Is there 
enough new and growing activity in new relative to old industries? Can new and 
growing firms get hold of the resources they need, or are these artificially locked into 
obsolete structures? Conversely, are the human and other resources that are freed up 
through firm contractions and discontinuations effectively redeployed in new and 
growing firms, or do they remain idle? Questions like these should arguable attain 
greater interest from policy-makers than should the fate of individual businesses.  
For researchers the problem of how conventional small business performance 
indicators should be interpreted has profound implications. One of the most important 
is that predictors of ‘survival’ should not necessarily be regarded as predictors of 
business success. Research has shown that the predictors of survival and high 
performance (whether subjective of objective) are in part different (Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Dahlqvist, Davidsson, & Wiklund, 2000; Headd, 2003).  
Therefore, in analyses of categorical outcomes more than two categories may have to 
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be included—and the analysis method chosen accordingly. Further, it is not 
necessarily the case that ‘marginal survival’ should be regarded a ‘better’ outcome 
than ‘discontinuation’ when, e.g., the three outcomes ‘discontinuation’, ‘marginal 
survival’ and ‘high performance’ are used. As noted above, there is reason to believe 
that predictors indicating some aspect of ‘entrepreneurial expertise’ should be 
associated with ‘high performance’ among survivors and with relatively rapid, low 
cost abandonment among non-survivors. If the analysis method dictates two outcomes 
the pairwise contrasting of several categories may be better than lumping together 
cases that may represent theoretically very different phenomena in a single ‘survival’ 
category. When discontinuation is used as an outcome criterion the interpretation can 
be improved if the analysis distinguishes between ‘voluntary’ and ‘non-voluntary’ 
discontinuation (Delmar & Shane, 2002); between closures reported as successful vs. 
unsuccessful by the owner (Headd, 2003) or between cases terminated with and 
without significant financial loss. There are also examples of sophisticated analysis 
approaches that researchers may want to adopt in future efforts in this area, such as 
Gimeno et al.’s (1997) modelling of variation in the individual threshold for 
acceptable performance, and Eckhardt, Shane and Delmar's (2006) multistage 
selection approach.  
As regards growth it seems advisable that researchers regard this as an 
intermediary variable rather than as the ultimate dependent variable that reflects 
attainment of business goals. In doing so, if seems advisable that researchers also pay 
attention to the type of growth. Firm growth is not a homogeneous phenomenon 
(Davidsson & Wiklund, 2000; Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Levie, 1997) and 
it is likely that different forms of growth are differently related to more ‘final’ 
business outcomes. If possible, growth should then be related to a more indisputably 
positive outcome like firm value (Cho & Pucic, 2005). As this is a measure that is 
very difficult to obtain—especially for small firms—subjective measures of goal 
attainment may be used instead. This should not be regarded only as a second best 
choice (or second to worst, as it is sometimes portrayed) necessitated by lack of data. 
As pointed out by Venkataraman (1997) the heterogeneity of firm resources and goals 
put in question whether performance relative to other firms really is the most relevant 
outcome assessment. More ideally, firms should be assessed relatively to what was 
maximally attainable with their unique resource configurations—and relative to what 
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they tried to achieve. The latter gives subjective outcome measures a legitimate place 
in business research. 
In conclusion, assessing and interpreting the performance of small firms is 
difficult. However, the situation is far from hopeless. The above has shown that 
knowledge we have already gained about small firm performance can help business 
founders, policy-makers and researchers to improve the chances of attaining the true 
goals of their respective activities. 
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